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In their Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress famously listed 
justice at the end, behind autonomy, beneficence, and non-maleficence.  They were 
explicit that this listing was not meant to suggest prioritization, but this is what 
seems to have happened over the years in the teaching and practice not only of 
bioethics but of other fields in applied ethics with which I am familiar.  
 
There are many explanations for how justice has tended to come last. Justice isn’t a 
single principle, but a topic area in social, political, and moral philosophy.  There 
is deep disagreement about which principle(s) of justice to adopt, and why.  By 
comparison, there is not deep disagreement about which principle of non-
maleficence to adopt (although there is disagreement about what counts as “harm” 
for the purposes of applying non-maleficence).  Moreover, justice finds its home as 
a characteristic of social institutions, although it may also be used to characterize 
individual relationships.  In Rawls’s characterization, for example, justice is the 
first virtue of social institutions. By contrast, many of the issues in applied ethics 
fields deal with relationships between professionals and their clients.  Even 
business ethics deals with questions about individual action, such as lying, loyalty, 
or responsibility.  For my purposes, what is important is that these issues about 
individuals and their relationships are treated first, rather than being situated within 
a framework of justice.   
 
It is thus not surprising that many texts in fields such as bioethics, engineering 
ethics, business ethics, and even environmental ethics treat justice as something of 
an afterthought.  It may appear in chapters about access to health care, the social 
responsibilities of business, or engineering and public welfare, or in environmental 
justice units on discrimination and the location of polluting factories. But justice is 
much less likely to appear as the overall ethical framework within which other 
issues in the field are situated. Instead, the other issues come first, treated outside 
of any framing justice might provide. When justice does appear, moreover, the 
most likely selections are from Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) and Nozick’s 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974).  These works, while surely setting the stage for 
discussions of justice over the ensuing 45 (yes, 45!) years, have been followed by 
many important, more recent developments.  These rarely make their way into 
texts for teaching most applied ethics courses. They are even less likely to make 
their way into bioethics courses. 
 
Both the marginalization of justice and the failure to consider much recent work 
are, I believe, deeply unfortunate. They are unfortunate in both directions: 
bioethics has much to learn from these developments, and these developments 
could well be tested and problematized in the context of bioethics.  These 
developments are also very useful teaching tools—an aspect I shall emphasize as 
of particular interest today.  So, let’s delve briefly into three theoretical 
developments in the post-Rawlsian space that I think are particularly important but 
that are too frequently off the radar screen in many bioethics texts and discussions:  
 --the discussions of luck egalitarianism 
 --the development of relational egalitarianism 




Rawls developed his view as a theory of justice for basic social institutions. But it 
quickly came under criticism as a theory about distributional end states, initially 
from Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.  Rawls’s veil of ignorance 
experiment was premised on the assumption that differences in skills and talents, 
economic and social conditions, and the like were arbitrary from a moral point of 
view. As such, Rawls argued, they should not be able to influence basic institutions 
for distributing the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.  Nozick argued that 
Rawls could adopt this view only at his peril:  Rawls, Nozick wrote, “can succeed 
in blocking the introduction of a person's autonomous choices and actions (and 
their results) only by attributing everything noteworthy about the person 
completely to certain sorts of ‘external’ factors. So denigrating a person's 
autonomy and prime responsibility for his actions is a risky line to take for a theory 
that otherwise wishes to buttress the dignity and self-respect of autonomous 
beings.”  Here began so-called “luck egalitarianism”: the idea that inequalities 
resulting from poor fortune are unjust, but inequalities resulting from poor choices 
are not.   
 
Inequalities in access to health care lie at the cusp of the interaction between bad 
luck and bad choices.  On the one hand, genetic endowments, epigenetic changes, 
and social determinants of health are bad luck.  Distributions of access to health 
care that fail to address inequalities resulting from these factors would be unjust.  
On the other hand, ski injuries might appear the result of poor choices, so perhaps 
it would not be unjust if people were expected to pay for knee-repairs.  Early on, 
luck egalitarians noted the interaction between choice and luck: between poor 
choices and their outcomes lies a great deal of luck.  Many individuals make what 
some argue are choices:  to smoke, to have unprotected sex, or to avoid a flu shot.  
Only a proportion of these will get lung cancer, become pregnant, or catch the flu. 
So these health outcomes are neither pure luck nor pure choice. 
 
A number of health policies may be informed by, or pose difficult issues for, luck 
egalitarianism.  Consider just these examples:  what should be included in minimal 
essential coverage?  Who, if anyone, should be expected to pay copays or 
deductibles as they access health care? Should premiums be adjustable for 
individual behavior such as smoking, participation in wellness programs, or 
engagement in risky activities? Should factors such as location or history of 
alcohol abuse affect access to the scarce resource of liver transplantation?  
 
In a paper published in 2006, Nir Eyal posed counter examples to standard 
versions of luck egalitarianism.  I present versions of them here that are adopted 
for access to health care.  First, Hero and Inconsiderate.  Hero sees a burning 
building and rushes into it to save a child.  Inconsiderate wakes up in the middle of 
the night to find his house on fire due to lightning.  Both suffer similar burns.  Had 
Hero not run into the burning building, he would not have been injured.  In all 
other respects, such as ability to purchase insurance, they are the same.  On 
standard luck egalitarian accounts, Inconsiderate’s injury would be bad brute luck 
but Hero’s would be bad option luck.  So the disadvantages of Hero’s injury are 
unjust but the disadvantages of Inconsiderate’s are not.  But Hero’s bad fortune 
seems unjust and surely does not reflect the desert considerations of primary 
concern to luck egalitarians.   
 
Eyal’s second example is called Acceptable and Saintly.  Acceptable lives in an 
area of the US where Zika infection is unlikely.  Acceptable could have moved, but 
does not, because of the costs and inconvenience of moving.  Saintly, however, 
does move, for the sole reason of avoiding Zika—and indeed is the only person 
who does move.  Soon after, a mutation in Zika results in widespread infection in 
both locations, which Acceptable and Saintly both catch.  Would it be just for 
Saintly to be compensated for the damage when Acceptable is not?  On some 
standard luck egalitarian views, Acceptable’s choice to incur the risk would count 
against compensation, so Saintly would have the stronger claim.  Again, Eyal 
thinks, this is counter intuitive: not every choice to incur risk should be viewed as 
vitiating claims for compensation. (Think: having intercourse while using highly 
effective forms of contraception, or walking outside alone at night.) 
 
On Eyal’s view, these standard versions of luck egalitarianism are misguided 
because they fail to take into account whether the choices are culpable. There is 
something to this view.  For example, people who deliberately choose not to get 
health insurance when they could easily have afforded it might be regarded as 
having chosen culpably.  It may also help unmask some of the judgments that lie 
behind students’ and others’ intuitions about whether alcoholics should be de-
prioritized for liver transplants, unmarried women should be held responsible for 
pregnancies even if they used highly effective contraceptives, and people who do 
not try to exercise or lose weight should bear some of the health costs that may 
result.  Some of the judgments students make may rest on assumptions about 
whether any of these behaviors are culpable. 
 
But there is much that is problematic about Eyal’s view, too.  There are questions 
about the availability and difficulty of alternatives, such as how much someone can 
be expected to give up to purchase health insurance or how far someone can be 
expected to travel to attend a weight loss class.  There are questions about internal 
constraints that affect choices, such as depression.  These questions also may be 
mediated by the presence of injustice, my third topic today. They surely are not 
easy to resolve, but they are at the heart of many health policy debates today.  
Having students consider luck egalitarianism’s insights and difficulties can help 




Recognizing some of the difficulties with luck egalitarianism, Elizabeth Anderson 
argued in “What is the Point of Equality?” that focusing on distribution as a 
question of compensating for bad luck—who gets which opportunities, resources, 
benefits, and the like—is mistaken. Instead, she defended a form of relational 
equality, in which the fundamental question is the role of equality in ending 
oppression. She understands oppression politically; one way to translate it into 
health care is to consider how decisions are made:  political decisions about the 
structure of health care systems, institutional decisions about the structure of care 
within institutions, and even decisions about patient care within the context of 
provider patient relationships.  
 
Here, let me use autonomy as an illustration. As autonomy is often presented, it’s 
described in terms of respect for individual choices.  For choices to be respected, 
people must not be coerced and must have decision making capacity.  People are 
coerced if they are subject to unjustified threats of force and perhaps also wrongful 
denial of rights or justified moral claims.  (Think: refusals to provide obstetric care 
without acquiescence in sterilization after delivery.) People have decision making 
capacity if they have at least a basic understanding of their values, their conditions, 
their treatment options, and the risks and benefits of these options; and if they are 
able to apply this understanding to realize their values, at least in some 
rudimentary way.  Thus understood, the exercise of autonomy is a matter of 
individual choice.  Autonomy is not seen as primarily relational, much less as 
located within a web of power relationships.  But this is to frame autonomy 
narrowly and in abstraction from the social contexts in which it is exercised. 
 
Take discussions of managed care or, more recently, accountable care 
organizations and whether they may fail to demonstrate respect for patient 
autonomy.  Ethical concerns raised about these forms of care delivery in terms of 
patient autonomy are whether they present patients with a reasonable set of options 
or whether they unjustifiably ration care.  Concerns also include whether they are 
sufficiently transparent about the motivations that may affect physician decision 
making about care options or whether they conceal economic incentives that 
present conflicts of interest. These forms of care delivery are seen as threats to 
autonomy if they unjustifiably limit options or information.  Only very occasional 
discussions have considered the political power relationships in how these care 
structures are organized. Oregon’s effort to expand Medicaid eligibility and paying 
for it by ranking the care that would be covered was seen as an example of 
deliberative democracy in action.  Some of the original health maintenance 
organizations such as Group Health of Puget Sound were seen as models of patient 
participation in deciding coverage.  But I have seen very little if any serious 
political philosophy address how these organizations are structured or whether the 
power relationships within them are problematic from the perspective of patient 
autonomy.  Similar points could be made about the delineation of essential health 
benefits for purposes of the Affordable Care Act.   
 
To be sure, there is frequent mention of the vulnerability of illness as a threat to 
autonomy.  But this vulnerability is seen primarily as individual deficiency, not as 
a structural issue about the organization of health care.  On the level of individual 
patient care, shared or supported decision making may be brought in to address 
failures of individual autonomy.  But these structures are viewed as substitutes, 
rather than being seen as integral to autonomous decision making itself.  
Accountable care organizations are supposed to put the patient at the center of a 
network of integrated care and to be accountable (to whom? Patients? Or payers?) 
for improved care quality.  According to NextGen HealthCare, a service provider 
to accountable care organizations, “Now imagine this . . . healthcare providers 
across the country, from primary care doctors and specialists, to hospitals and large 
health systems, are all collaborating and coordinating care with each other to 
improve outcomes for their patient populations – and getting paid well in return.”  
Descriptions such at this at best put the patient at the center as the object of care.  
They do not consider questions such as how to decide which collaborations matter, 
what count as improved outcomes, or how very well paid physicians should be. 
 
Here, bioethics has much to learn from a centerpiece of disability rights advocacy, 
“nothing about us without us.”  And here, too, bioethics confronts several different 
aspects of non-ideal theory:  the natural misfortune of illness, the impact of unjust 
social institutions, and the ethical difficulties that arise when recognition of duties 
of justice is uneven. 
 
Non-Ideal and Partial Compliance Theory 
 
John Rawls famously introduced the distinction between ideal theory and partial 
compliance theory in A Theory of Justice. (1971) While theorizing about justice for 
ideal circumstances, Rawls recognized that different approaches might be needed 
where either natural or social circumstances were less than ideal.  Non-ideal theory 
treats issues such as how progress can best be made toward justice, what injustices 
take precedence to address, what strategies are likely to create new roadblocks to 
overcoming injustice, or what are the obligations of individuals or institutions 
when others continue to behave unjustly. (Cohen 2000; Miller 2011).  This last—
what to do when unjust behavior is fairly widespread—is specifically partial 
compliance theory. 
 
Rawls didn’t see the need for non-ideal theory as a problem about ideals, but as 
about whether real world circumstances were such that ideals could reasonably be 
applied to them. Within the past ten to fifteen years, discussions in political 
philosophy of non-ideal and partial compliance theory have burgeoned.  Like 
Rawls, these discussions, largely see the problems as lying with existing 
circumstances, not with the construction of ideals. For example, Zofia 
Stemplowska, in “What’s Ideal about Ideal Theory?” sees ideal theory as “theory 
that fails to issue recommendations for how to improve our society that are 
applicable for us here and now.”  She thinks theories that assume full compliance 
(and thus are inapplicable to present circumstances) can still be useful because they 
provide a standard against which to judge whether comparatively we are taking 
steps towards the ideal and to have a picture of what an ideal might look like.  On 
these views, ideal theory remains the touchstone and it seems reasonable that this 
should be the primary focus of inquiry.  Problems of how to get towards the ideal 
are problems of transition that hopefully will pass. Or, they require attention to 
what individuals should do as a matter of fairness when others are not doing their 
share:  should they try to make up for others, just do what would have been their 
fair share, or give up if partial efforts will not solve ultimate problems. 
 
An alternative, however, is that there are difficulties in the formulation of ideals 
themselves. Amartya Sen (2009, 2006), for example, emphasizes the importance of 
comparative rather than transcendental theories of justice.  Sen argues that theories 
of justice need not take a complete or totalist form for many reasons, including 
information gaps, difficulties in judging among considerations that have a 
dimension of weight, or the need to make political room for areas of agreement or 
disagreement among different points of view. A major driver of Sen’s approach is 
his view about the limits of social choice and the ability of decision procedures to 
yield partial but incomplete agreement.  
 
I agree with Sen that the problem lies in part with ideals, although my starting 
places are somewhat different than his.  As I see justice, it is a matter of ongoing 
work at inclusion and flourishing:  what next steps, at individual or social levels, 
will enable individuals in all their differences to do well at what matters to them? 
In my view, a picture of ideal justice might be so abstract as to be vacuous, so 
fuzzy as to be unrecognizable, or perhaps even positively misleading.  
 
Here, universal health care in the US is a useful example, which Sen uses.  Seen 
comparatively, the US is a more just society if it includes more people receiving 
funding for health care appropriate to their conditions and choices, when others are 
already receiving similar care.  To make judgments of this kind, we do not need a 
complete picture of what a fully just health care system would look like. Indeed, 
given developing technology, changing understandings of the nature of disease, the 
ever-shifting world of disease itself, and conflicting demands on social resources, 
we may not be able to say what a fully just health care system would look like. 
Idealization might tempt us to say:  it would be a system in which everyone got the 
greatest amount of needed health care possible under the circumstances.  But this 
idealization might be vacuous—what is this greatest amount?—or, more 
disturbingly, it might lead us into a situation (not so unrecognizably like the 
problems we have today) wherein everyone might think that getting more health 
care for themselves is a matter of urgent justice, when it might not be 
comparatively more just at all.  
 
Expanding inclusion addresses what would be incremental improvements in the 
justice of social institutions involved in health care.  Another kind of non-ideal 
problem is that of partial compliance:  how to address circumstances in which 
some are behaving in ways that have come to be recognized as unjust.  On the 
provider side, admittedly controversial examples might be the failure to provide 
accommodations for patients with disabilities or the refusal to accept at least some 
share of patients funded by Medicaid reimbursement rates.  On the patient side, 
again controversially, we might want to consider whether decisions not to 
participate in the shared costs of health insurance coverage are unjust. Seeing these 
decisions as partial compliance questions frames them as problems of participation 
in furthering justice, as part of a justice as a social project.  That’s a different frame 
from more common ones in terms of whether the restrictions on liberty that may be 
imposed are justified in order to avoid free rider problems or even to distribute 
burdens of compliance fairly.  It forces us to ask how decisions by some to opt out 
might impact comparative improvements in justice in the sense of fostering 
inclusion in the circumstances in which we actually live.  That’s a very different 
question from whether those who opt out take unfair advantage of those who do 
not, much less whether in an ideally just world the freedom of individuals to opt 




Let me sum up.  In my judgment, applied ethics is ineluctably non-ideal and partial 
compliance theory.  It’s ethics in the context of unjust institutions and conduct.  
Theorizing or teaching about concepts such as autonomy in abstraction from this 
recognition is misleading.  Instead, questions such as how to realize autonomy 
should be framed in the context of incomplete justice.  There’s much to be learned 
from the past nearly 50 years of discussions of justice to help with this enterprise, 
but they are too little known or discussed in much contemporary bioethics. 
 
 
